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1. Introduction 
Karp (2018) estimates that the United States, at 1.2 firearms per capita, has a higher rate of firearms 
ownership than anywhere in the world – more than double the rate of war-torn Yemen (0.53) and thrice 
that of postwar Serbia and Montenegro (both at 0.39). Firearms ownership per se need not be a problem, 
but the United States also suffers from the highest rates of firearms-related harm in the high-income 
world. For example, in 2017, the U.S. rate of firearms homicide of 4.5 per 100,000 people was over 13 
times that of its equally well-off northern neighbor, Canada (National Center for Health Statistics, 2018). 
Informed by the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees its citizens the right to 
keep and bear arms, the United States also has some of the laxest firearms laws globally, resulting in the 
world’s largest civilian firearms market. In 2017, nearly 57,000 federally licensed firearms outlets in the 
United States retailed a total of about 12.8 million firearms, about one-third of which were supplied by 
imports (DOJ/ATF, 2019).  
Goods designed to multiply the potential for violence can theoretically be expected to provoke overall 
welfare declines. This study is therefore justified by an adverse externality that, in turn, begs an 
understanding of the underlying market in the first place. And while much public discussion in the U.S. 
can give the impression that some wish to eliminate the firearms market altogether, economists will give 
pause, understanding better than most the often deleterious effects of supply-side suppression (e.g., 
Beletsky and Davis (2017); Moore (2010)). Moreover, firearms proponents and opponents agree that with 
the privilege of firearms ownership comes the responsibility of legitimate and safe use, and they share 
the goal of reducing firearms-related harm. In theory, then, the design and evaluation of effective firearms 
legislation should parameterize the firearms market. 
Econometric analysis of the legal firearms market is, however, a prerequisite to making informed policy 
decisions. This is true for at least three reasons. First, while most gun crimes are committed with illegally-
acquired weapons, virtually all firearms in the U.S. are initially manufactured and sold legally (Fabio, Duell, 
Creppage, O’Donnell, & Laporte, 2016). Second, firearms are often viewed as both cause and effect of 
eroding public security, stimulating demand for private security (Fleitas, Espinoza, & Perret, 2015). By 
raising perceived or actual levels of insecurity, the supply of firearms may generate its own demand, 
requiring instrumental variable (IV) models to account for potential endogeneity. Indeed, the availability 
of firearms on the nonmilitary (i.e., the civilian and law enforcement) market is a function of complex 
supply chains (Brauer & Muggah, 2006) involving domestic manufacture; imports; exports; flows between 
civilian, law enforcement, and military stocks (Masera, 2016); and a dynamic interplay between licit and 
illicit markets and retail outlets. Third, moral hazard, balloon effects, relative elasticities of supply and 
demand, and other economic phenomena may affect the efficacy of certain types of policy interventions 
seeking to reduce firearms-related harm.  
As an initial step toward characterizing the U.S. firearms market, we simultaneously estimate supply and 
demand curves for the industry. To perform credible market studies, economists require reliable data on 
prices and quantities. Ongoing data scarcity and lack of data openness, transparency, and access in the 
firearms industry and among U.S. government regulatory bodies have historically hindered studies of its 
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firearms market. In this paper, we use a combination of publicly available and uniquely derived datasets, 
including both firearms quantities domestically produced and imported, and prices, that collectively allow 
us to fully characterize the market by simultaneously predicting supply and demand volumes as a function 
of price. Thereafter, we separately investigate three phenomena not included in the primary analysis due 
to fewer study years being available to test each: 
(i) industry concentration and potential cartel behavior; 
(ii) the effect of a technology gap between domestically produced and imported weapons; and 
(iii) violent crimes against persons (mass shootings and other violent crimes). 
With one notable exception, we find that the firearms market functions like any other. The exception is 
that while greater recent civilian firearms stocks decrease the annual demand flow for new firearms, 5-
year lagged stocks actually increase demand flows. Further lending credence to the idea that firearms 
generate their own demand, homicides and mass shootings are also associated with greater purchases. 
Further, we find that (demand-restrictive) firearms legislation does not affect realized demand, except for 
the time-limited Federal Assault Weapons Ban which was in effect from 1994—2004. We also find that 
U.S. participation in acute extraterritorial violent conflicts and higher industry concentration in certain 
submarkets (particularly pistols) boosts quantity supplied, suggesting economies of scale. Finally, we find 
evidence that a technology gap between imports and exports intuitively decreases quantities purchased. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on the economics of firearms, 
as part of the somewhat larger small arms market. Section 3 discusses our research method adopted for 
this study, a simultaneous equation model with an exogenous instrumental variable. Section 0 presents 
our results, including the effects of certain model controls such as civilian firearms stocks, the role of 
military veterans in firearms demand, and federal firearms legislation. Section 5 explores three additional 
influences on the firearms market: industry concentration, crime (mass shootings, other homicides, and 
other violent crime), and a technology gap between U.S. and foreign firearms producers. Section 6 sums 
up and concludes with a discussion, highlighting possible policy lessons. 
2. Literature Review 
Despite its large size and prominent role in early American industrialization (Brauer, Montolio, & Trujillo-
Baute, 2017, footnote 2), the U.S. civilian firearms market remains largely uncharacterized from the point 
of view of economic analysis. One key limitation is data (Muggah & McDougal, 2014). Gabelnick, Haug, 
and Lumpe (2006) note a number of post-9/11 policy developments restricting data accessibility via the 
Department of Justice’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the Department of 
Defense, the Census Bureau, and the Customs and Border Protection Service (CBP), and also demonstrate 
significant data discrepancies across various U.S. agencies responsible for tracking firearms production, 
sales, imports, and exports. Brauer (2013b) has noted that, on a national level, we have quantity data but 
not price data, both of which are indispensable pieces in market characterization. Brauer (2013a), 
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however, proposed a method for estimating yearly price indices for firearms, which was implemented and 
used here to generate the data employed in this study. 
The legal U.S. market for firearms comprises four distinct segments: pistols, revolvers, rifles, and shotguns. 
The pistol market has seen numerous producers enter and exit the market over the 1980-2010 period 
(and since then) while the revolver and shotgun markets were both stable duopolies (Ruger and Smith & 
Wesson in the former, Mossberg/Maverick and Remington in the second). The rifle market was diverse, 
though its top holding company enjoyed over 30% market share spread over several brands (Brauer, 
2013b). Taken as a whole, the industry has exhibited severe production vacillations over the period 1980-
2010 (Brauer, 2013b), with generally greatly heightened production in the 2010s and since then (see 
Figure 1 in Section 3.2 below). Prior to 2010, mass shootings tended to significantly reduce the stock prices 
of firearms manufacturers, possibly indicating a risk to producers of tighter legislation. This stock price 
reduction effect disappears after 2010, however, possibly indicating that worries of such legal crackdowns 
in the most recent decade have done more to boost demand than to threaten producers (Gopal & 
Greenwood, 2017; Jones & Stone, 2015). End-user “friendly” state legislation positively influences 
manufacturers’ location decisions, but only as one among other factors which also include relative tax 
burden, wage profiles, and agglomeration effects (Brauer et al., 2017). 
 
Figure 1. Annual domestic firearms production, export, and imports (lines, secondary y-axis) and BLS price index 
(area, primary y-axis) by year. Source: DOJ/ATF (2019) & BLS (2019). 
 
The firearms market in the U.S. has for some years been described as “mature”, “saturated,” and even 
“stagnant” (Diaz, 2004), which until 2005 was demonstrably true but not since then, when unit sales vastly 
increased (see Figure 1 below). The market came under heavy foreign competition, especially in the pistol 
segment, starting in the mid-1980s, and yielded considerable market share to foreign brands in the 
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decades since, following trends in many other U.S. manufacturing industries (Brauer, 2013b). Beginning 
in the 1990s and 2000s, the market has relied on a combination of product design innovations (often 
making their products more deadly; see (Diaz, 2004; Smith  et al., 2015), market demographic expansion 
(Blair & Hyatt, 1995; NSSF, 2014, 2015), and demand-stoking via vested interests, especially leveraging 
fear of crises and tightened legislation (see, e.g., Gopal & Greenwood, 2017; Langley, 1999). For instance, 
the impending passage of the federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 spurred the 
demand for, and production of, AR15-(assault-)style weapons that would soon be banned, creating a pre-
passage price depression and a post-passage price surge (Koper & Roth, 2002). 
There is a small but growing body of evidence on illicit firearms markets. They may operate with 
considerable transaction costs, resulting in much higher prices than on the legal market (Cook, Ludwig, 
Venkatesh, & Braga, 2007). They also rely on a varied set of pathways from the legal market (Chestnut et 
al., 2017), most often using near-to-retail diversions to obtain the firearms (Braga, Wintemute, Pierce, 
Cook, & Ridgeway, 2012). There is substantial interstate trafficking in firearms (Knight, 2013) due to the 
patchwork of legislation at subnational levels (Vernick, Webster, Bulzacchelli, & Mair, 2006), and a large 
quantity of small arms are trafficked annually from the U.S. into Mexico (McDougal, Shirk, Muggah, & 
Patterson, 2015). 
As suggested in the introduction, endogeneity between quantity and price of firearms seems plausible. 
One the one hand, greater quantities of firearms supplied may, all other things equal, generate 
heightened levels of homicide and other victimization (including suicide) (Anglemyer, Horvath, & 
Rutherford, 2014). Variations in U.S. state laws regulating access to firearms have even had knock-on 
effects on homicide rates across the southern border in Mexico (Chicoine, 2011; Dube, Dube, & García-
Ponce, 2013). On the other hand, lower levels of perceived or actual public security may also generate 
heightened demand for firearms as a source of personal protection (McDowall & Loftin, 1983), thereby 
driving up prices and spurring production quantities. Accounting for the possible existence of such circular 
causation suggests the use of instrumental variable regression. We now outline our statistical research 
strategy (Section 3) and then present the results (Section 4). 
3. Methods 
3.1. Empirical Strategy 
We exclusively employ OLS models with natural logs of prices and quantities as primary outcomes and 
regressors – a choice both simple and appropriate to the task. In order to account for possible  
endogeneity in the estimation of firearms quantities produced as a function of prices, we employ a 
simultaneous 3-stage least squares instrumental variable model in which demand-side price is 
instrumented using measures of the severity of natural disasters. The supply and demand functions can 
be represented separately as simultaneous equations (see, e.g., Yobero (2016)): 
Supply:   Ln𝑄𝑡
𝑚  =  𝛼 + 𝛽Ln(𝑃𝑡) + 𝐺 ∑ Ln𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡
1  (1) 
Demand:  Ln𝑄𝑡
𝑚 =  𝛿 + 𝜅Ln(𝑃𝑡) + 𝑀 ∑ Ln𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡
2 (2) 
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Instrument: Ln(𝑃𝑡) = 𝛾 + ρLn(𝐷t−1) + 𝜖𝑡
3   (3) 
where 𝑄𝑡
𝑚is the equilibrium quantity of firearms produced and sold for market 𝑚 in year 𝑡, 𝑃𝑡 is inflation-
adjusted firearms prices on the U.S. legal market, 𝑋𝑡−1 is a vector of other potential variables (economic, 
political) that could determine the sales of firearms in the U.S., while 𝑌𝑡−1 is a vector of other potential 
variables (economic, political) that could determine the demand of firearms in the U.S. 𝐷t−1 in Eq. (3) is a 
measure of the effects of natural disasters. By “market” (𝑚), we mean one of three production categories: 
(1) domestic production for the domestic market (or nonexport production in the U.S.), (2) domestic 
production for foreign markets (exports), and (3) foreign production for the domestic market (imports). 
𝐷 serves as our instrumental variable and refers to certain measures of natural disasters. There is some 
anecdotal evidence that firearms are in greater demand following natural disasters, when strained law 
enforcement institutions may struggle to guarantee property rights and enforce contracts (see, e.g., NPR, 
2006). Such observations would be in line with findings more broadly linking collective security to demand 
for firearms in Detroit for example (McDowell and Loftin, 1983). Conversely, however, the effect of the 
2010 earthquake in Haiti was to dampen prices for firearms ammunition in that country; see McDougal et 
al. (2018.) 
Per standard econometric estimations of supply and demand, we use logged outcome and primary 
predictor variables (see, e.g., Yobero, 2016; Zarembka, 1968), implying that resulting coefficients may be 
interpreted as elasticities. We also use lag predictor variables pertaining to the supply-side to allow for 
large firms to adjust and adapt to changes, as well as to meet the temporality criterion for demonstrating 
Granger causality (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). We do not attempt to model year fixed-effects, as they 
would be collinear with many of our other predictor variables. 
3.2. Data 
Data for our mediating and outcome variables – inflation-adjusted firearms prices on the U.S. legal market 
(1947-2017) and quantity of firearms for market m, respectively – come from the Department of 
Commerce’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 2019) and the U.S. Department of Justice’s ATF (DOJ/ATF, 
2019) and other data. The BLS price index, when inflation-adjusted, is similar, but not identical, to firearms 
prices as a percentage of personal income (see Figure 2). 
Secondary, separate price indices for domestic handguns (1980-2017), domestic long guns (1980-2017), 
and imported handguns (1989-2017) were reverse-computed from the U.S. Treasury’s Tax and Trade 
Bureau (TTB, 2019) and the U.S. Department of Justice’s ATF data (DOJ/ATF, 2019). These are used to test 
findings in the handgun and long-gun sub-markets separately. The TTB gives tax obligations (slightly 
different from taxes collected) on firearms sales by manufacturer and importer supplying the wholesale 
or retail chain. Since the tax rate is known (e.g., 10% on handguns), one can take, say, $100 million in 
handgun tax obligations divided by 0.1 to compute $1 billion in handgun sales. We divide the figures on 
total sales volume by the ATF handgun production and Census/ITC import data to get a nominal average 
handgun price, and then deflate and index (2012 = 100) the result. 
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Figure 2. Inflation-adjusted small arms price index (primary y-axis, 2012 = 100) and small arms price as a 
percentage of mean personal income (secondary y-axis) by year. Sources: BLS (2019), the authors. 
 
Quantity outcomes include domestic production for U.S. markets, exports, and imports. Domestic 
production for the U.S. market is calculated by subtracting reported exports from total domestic 
production. Total production already excludes manufactured weapons that go into producer inventories 
(though wholesalers and retailers may have inventories of their own for which we have no data). Imports, 
exports, and total U.S.-made firearms sold on U.S. markets are depicted above in Figure 1 against the 
backdrop of the BLS inflation-adjusted small arms price index. Visually and as one might expect, 
production spikes tend to correlate to price depressions and vice versa. 
Our instrumental variable candidates having to do with the disasters were obtained from EM-DAT, the 
International Disasters Database maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
(CRED) at the School of Public Health, Université Catholique de Louvain. Using the World Bank’s country-
year data on population and GDP, we created population rates of three variables (number of people 
affected by disaster, number of people rendered homeless by disaster, and the number of people killed 
in disasters) and normalized a fourth by GDP (to create a proxy for economic damages as a percentage of 
GDP). We then created log-normal versions of each of these variables for use in our models. We 
eliminated two candidates as IVs that were irrelevant to the mediator (i.e., log damages per GDP and log 
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disaster deaths per 100,000 people). For our empirical tests of the remaining two candidates, see Section 
4.1 below. 
Table 1. Summary statistics for the major outcome, mediating, and instrumental variables. 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Median Max Skewness 
Log U.S. Firearms Production for U.S. 
Market 
72 15.06 0.50 14.14 15.12 16.18 -0.01 
Log Imported Firearms to U.S. Market 72 8.23 7.08 0.00 13.23 15.55 -0.28 
Log U.S. Firearms Exports 72 12.40 0.47 11.62 12.36 13.28 0.11 
Log BLS Firearms Price Index 71 4.55 0.08 4.41 4.51 4.66 0.06 
Log Brauer Handgun Price Index 38 4.50 0.13 4.06 4.50 4.68 -0.98 
Log Brauer Long Gun Price Index 38 4.46 0.14 4.15 4.48 4.77 -0.11 
Log Brauer Imported Handgun Price Index 29 4.67 0.10 4.45 4.66 4.90 0.14 
Log People Rendered Homeless by Disasters 
Per 100k 
73 0.56 0.98 0 0 4.59 2.04 
Log Disaster-Affected People Per 100k 73 2.31 2.49 0 1.63 10.18 0.88 
 
We use most of our control variables to control for demand-side phenomena; only three variables – 
unemployment rate, conflict intensity, and cumulative conflict intensity – do we deem to affect supply 
most directly. Unemployment rate presumably affects producers by changing the costs of finding and 
retaining labor. War intensity and cumulative intensity may raise firearms production and capacity more 
generally, as many U.S.-based firearms manufacturers serve both the military and the nonmilitary 
markets5. Population, real income per capita, and unemployment rate all come from the Federal Reserve 
Economic Data (FRED II database). Numbers of U.S. veterans were obtained from annual Bureau of 
Veterans Affairs reports. Presidential party and Republican shares of the U.S. House of Representatives 
and Senate were obtained from public government records. 
Firearms stocks were calculated with a cumulative subtraction algorithm from a recent starting point 
estimate. We began with a 2017 estimate by (Karp, 2018) of 393,347,000. We assumed an annual stock 
depreciation rate of 0%. This unrealistically low number is adopted because the total official domestic 
sales in the United States between 2011 (the year of the previous Small Arms Survey estimate of 270 
million (Small Arms Survey, 2011)) and 2017 cannot collectively account for the difference between those 
two point estimates: the Small Arms Survey point estimates suggest a stock growth of 123.3 million 
firearms, but the official domestic sales in the intervening period totaled just 92 million. 
Koper and Roth (2002) describe how the anticipated passage of the 1994 Federal Assault Weapons Ban 
drove up production by foresighted suppliers. Later, as prices rose following the ban’s passage, supply 
dwindled due to the legal restrictions. Existing weapons were “grandfathered” in (meaning allowed under 
the laws in effect at the time of their purchase) and available for sale and resale during the ban-years. To 
model anticipated legislative changes, we generate an integer variable that is set by default to 0, but adds 
1 for each year preceding the passage of a major piece of restrictive U.S. gun control legislation and 
 
5 The U.S. military does not tend to issue spot-orders to fill any immediate demand needs. That said, it is true that 
current and cumulative external conflict increases wear and tear and leads to replacement needs, even if stretched 
out over time (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2012). These conflict events and periods may also be associated with higher security 
sensitivity and fear transmission in the general U.S. population (e.g., after the events of 9/11), and therefore with a 
hypothetical uptick in the civilian market. All-in-all it seems at least plausible that this variable may play a role in 
supply decisions. 
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subtracts one for each year preceding the passage of a major of U.S. legislation relaxation of firearms 
controls. We also generate a running cumulative variable to proxy for the strength of firearms control 
laws in any given year. Pertinent laws are listed in Table 3. 
Table 2. Summary statistics for control variables. 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Median Max Skewness 
Log Population 72 12.33 0.24 11.86 12.35 12.69 -0.26 
Log Military Veterans 73 17.01 0.14 16.65 17.03 17.21 -0.55 
Log Civilian Firearms Stocks 72 18.66 0.71 17.34 18.77 19.79 -0.18 
Real Income Per Capita 70 -3.90 0.45 -4.70 -3.88 -3.25 -0.22 
Unemployment Rate 70 5.79 1.61 2.90 5.60 9.70 0.59 
Log Real GDP (U.S.$2010) 58 9.02 0.51 8.06 9.08 9.76 -0.22 
Presidential Party (Dem = 1) 72 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.06 
Share Republican: House 72 0.45 0.07 0.32 0.44 0.57 0.13 
Share Republican: Senate 72 0.46 0.07 0.32 0.45 0.55 -0.35 
Anticipated Firearms Legislation Passage 73 0.04 0.39 -1.00 0.00 2.00 1.82 
Log Gun Laws 73 0.93 0.66 0.00 1.10 1.79 -0.44 
Federal Assault Weapons Ban 73 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.11 
UCDP Summed Conflict Intensity 73 2.62 3.10 0.00 2.00 13.00 1.28 
UCDP Summed Cumulative Conflict Intensity 73 1.48 1.80 0.00 1.00 7.00 1.24 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 32 840.22 89.37 689.88 860.79 1030.1 -0.07053 
Technology Gap 29 0.1492 0.1954 -0.106 0.075 0.5912 0.70039 
Log Fatal Shootings 35 2.5593 1.0848 0 2.7081 4.2767 -0.72679 
Log Violent Crimes 53 13.857 0.581 12.381 14.098 14.474 -1.39734 
Log Murders 53 9.7232 0.2994 8.9737 9.7857 10.115 -1.17389 
 
Table 3. Major pieces of federal gun legislation and their effects on the generated firearms control variable. 
Year Legislation Variable Effect 
1968 Gun Control Act 1 
1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 1 
1986 Firearm Owners Protection Act -1 
1988 Undetectable Firearms Act 1 
1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act 1 
1993 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act 1 
1994 Federal Assault Weapons Ban 1 
2004 Federal Assault Weapons Ban (expiry) -1 
2005 Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms -1 
 
The experience of U.S. extraterritorial armed conflict is captured by two variables derived from the 
Uppsala Conflict Database Program’s (UCDP) Armed Conflict Dataset (version 19.1) (Gleditsch, 
Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002; Pettersson, Högbladh, & Öberg, 2019). The two original 
variables describe (a) intensity of each armed conflict in a given year (0-2), and (b) a binary (0,1) variable 
for cumulative intensity, denoting whether a conflict has equaled or exceeded 1,000 battle-related deaths 
since its inception. We first expanded this dataset to have the unit of analysis of country-conflict-year 
rather than conflict-year. We then collapsed the result by country-year, summing the conflict intensity 
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and cumulative intensity scores and yielding the variables we used for this study. Hence, the variable 
merged into our dataset represents the combined intensities of all conflicts in which the United States 
took part in a given year. 
Several control variables were not included in the main models due to their limited observations, including 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), technology gap, fatal shootings, total violent crimes, and murders. 
Nevertheless, we deemed these variables important enough to merit inclusion in tailored spin-off 
analyses. HHIs were calculated in the usual way using ATF-reported quantities of arms sold per producing 
Federal Firearms License (FFL). However, they will be floor estimates, as multiple FFLs manufacture arms 
are subsidiaries of a single holding corporation. Without in-depth knowledge of shifting corporate 
ownership structures, it is not possible to produce more accurate HHIs. The technology gap refers to the 
fact that imported weapons were considered more sophisticated than the U.S.-made competition during 
the 1980s and 1990s. We model this technology gap simply by normalizing the difference in price indices 
between imported and domestic handguns by the price index of domestic handguns. Crime figures come 
from the U.S. Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, 2019). 
3.3. Instrumental Variables 
We identify four possible instrumental variables for our models: variables that might affect the price in 
the short-run, but not the quantity of firearms bought or sold. We introduced possible IV variables 
measuring the effects of natural disasters. While not necessarily exogenous to economic performance 
(Botzen, Deschenes, & Sanders, 2019), the effects of natural disasters may nevertheless be more 
exogenous than other economic disruptions of national scale and has been used as an IV in previous 
papers (McDougal, Kolbe, Muggah, & Marsh, 2018; Ramsay, 2011). However, their effects on prices and 
quantities of firearms are theoretically ambiguous: if they raise demand in the context of inelastic supply 
(or decrease supply in the context of inelastic demand), prices might rise without significant increases in 
quantity. Conversely, if they raise demand in the context of perfectly elastic supply (or decrease supply in 
the context of perfectly elastic demand), quantity might change without a corresponding change in price. 
We therefore test empirically log population killed by natural disasters (in a given year per 100,000 
population), log population “affected” by natural disasters (in any way, including being killed, rendered 
homeless, displaced, etc.), log population rendered homeless, and log economic damages in constant U.S. 
dollars, for both relevance (to firearms prices) and exogeneity (vis-à-vis quantity of firearms sold) in 
uncontrolled and controlled OLS regressions. Controlled models include all covariates we later use in our 
full 3SLS regressions. We choose price as the IV mediator because we deem the total quantity of firearms 
sold on U.S. markets to be of greater direct policy import than prices. Table 4 summarizes Appendix Table 
1 and Appendix Table 2, demonstrating that in controlled models, only log deaths due to disasters is both 
relevant (to price) and exogenous (to quantity). The other three candidates would meet the IV criteria 
only for a model that used a mediator of quantity to predict price. 
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Table 4. Prospective instrumental variables assessed for relevance and exogeneity. 
  Relevance (to price) Exogenous (to quantity) 
Prospective Instrumental Variable Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled 
          
Log Deaths Due to Disasters No (+) Yes (-) Yes (+) Yes (+) 
Log People Rendered Homeless by Disasters Yes (+) No (+) No (+) Yes (+) 
Log Total Affected by Disasters Yes (-) No (+) No (+) Yes (+) 
Log Total Damages Due to Disasters (US$1,000) Yes (+) No (+) No (+) Yes (-) 
 
Employing uncontrolled and controlled Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests, the residual terms from the first-stage 
equations are not significant (p = 0.4542 and p = 0.939 respectively) in predicting the outcome of domestic 
production for the U.S. market, indicating that controlling for possible endogeneity between price and 
quantity is not necessary (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993). Given the responsiveness of price to log disaster 
deaths, we use the latter below in predicting price in our SEMs. 
4. Basic Results 
We present uncontrolled and controlled coefficients for the lagged price mediator in SEMs for three 
logged outcomes: 
1. domestic production of domestically-sold firearms; 
2. exports of domestically-produced firearms; and 
3. imported production of domestically-sold firearms. 
For each logged quantity outcome, we run ten models containing the log price predictor: supply and 
demand, each for five control scenarios. Results are presented in Table 5 (regressions that inform this 
summary coefficient table are presented in: Appendix Table 3, Appendix Table 4, and Appendix Table 5). 
The results indicate that our primary outcome follows standard microeconomic theory. The price elasticity 
of supply is positive and significant across all model specifications that include any controls, indicating 
that domestic producers are willing to make more firearms as prices rise. Conversely, the price elasticity 
of demand is negative and significant in all models that include economic controls, indicating that buyers 
are less willing to purchase firearms as prices rise. The same signs (though different statistical 
significances) are seen in the case of exports, possibly suggesting that U.S. domestic prices are correlated, 
if imperfectly, with prices on foreign firearms markets. Finally, while foreign supplies appear to respond 
positively (and dramatically) to higher prices, the elasticity of demand for imports also appears positive 
(except in the case of economic controls only, where it is negative and significant). This might be explained 
by noting that the BLS small arms price index is a producer-price index and entirely dictated by U.S.-made 
firearms; therefore, rising domestic firearms prices might be expected to drive customers to imports in a 
substitution effect, and vice versa. This interpretation is contextualized by the fact that imports were 
initially more technologically sophisticated than U.S.-made firearms and therefore commanded higher 
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prices. In competition with improving U.S. weapons, the price gap eventually closed over the course of 
the 1980s and 1990s (see Figure 3 and section 5). 
Table 5. Summary coefficients for firearms price in SEM regressions on various outcomes (IV = log people affected 
by natural disasters per 100,000). 

















Supply 5.259 4.538*** 6.911*** 3.327** 7.471*** 3.422*** 
Demand 6.106 -2.544 -7.984*** 7.041*** 4.580 -3.288** 
Exports  
Supply 5.492 1.294* 3.414*** 0.120 5.331*** 1.502** 
Demand 6.376 -9.883* -13.12*** 1.055 -3.912 -1.088 
Imports  
Supply 98.32** 88.94*** 91.23*** 99.38*** 108.5*** 90.02*** 
Demand 114.2** 51.27 -109.7** 124.0*** 50.72* 27.38* 
1 X (supply): None. Y (demand): Population, military veterans, estimated firearms stocks, homicide rates, suicide rates. 
2 X: Unemployment rate. Y: Per capita real disposable income. 
3 X: UCDP conflict intensity, cumulative UCDP conflict intensity. Y: Party of the President, Republican share of Senate, 
Republican share of House. 
4 X: None. Y: Anticipated firearms legislation passage, cumulative firearms legal onus, federal Assault Weapons Ban. 
 
 
Figure 3. Imported (red) and domestic (green) handgun prices indices by year, plotted along with the overall 
inflation-adjusted BLS small arms price index (blue). 2012 = 100. 
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A few other results of our SEM also merit mention. In terms of U.S. production for domestic sale, Appendix 
Table 3 indicates that, as we had supposed, the unemployment rate is indeed a positive and highly 
significant predictor of quantity supplied. This suggests that higher unemployment rates unsurprisingly 
make it cheaper to pay worker salaries, and thus fits the general pattern of manufacture moving to lower-
cost states (Brauer et al., 2017). Conversely, higher income is associated with more purchases on the 
demand side. The intensity of U.S. conflicts abroad is associated with greater production for civilian 
markets, possibly because of production economies of scale. Homicides are significantly associated with 
heightened future demand in both models in which they figure; suicides are not. The military veteran 
population is positively and significantly associated with demand when controlling for recent and 5-year 
lagged stocks (see below). Democratic-party U.S. presidents are generally associated with a boost the 
quantity demanded by around 10%, presumably due to fears of potential future federal firearms 
legislation. The share of Republican legislators in the House of Representatives is also positively associated 
with demand rises. However, the effects of legislation itself are mixed. The number of federal firearms 
laws (i.e., the running total of federal sales restrictions as described above) is not correlated to firearms 
unit sales, bucking popular presumption. The exception to this is the Federal Assault Weapons Ban, in 
effect from 1994-2004, which is credited by the SEM with a 0.25% decline in domestic firearms sales for 
U.S. markets. Overall, the models with sociodemographic and economic controls were most highly 
predictive of demand, explaining 86% and 64% of its variation, respectively. The model with political 
controls (including U.S. war involvement) was most highly predictive of supply, explaining 18% of its 
variation. 
Intrigued by the non-association between estimated firearms stocks in civilian hands and current demand, 
we hypothesized that opposite trends may be simultaneously operating. Current stocks may satiate 
demand, while legacy stocks may boost it by increasing the likelihood that firearms fall into the wrong 
hands or are used for violent ends. We therefore introduced a 5-year lag of estimated civilian firearms 
stocks. Indeed, we found a significant (p = 0.004) and positive association for current stocks, and an even 
more significant (p = 0.000) and negative association for lagged stocks. 
5. Other Influences 
Certain factors we could not include in the overall models due to study period limitations on associated 
data. We therefore chose to deal with three important issues separately. The first two regard industry 
composition, namely: (1) industry concentration and cartel behavior, and (2) the technology gap between 
U.S. and foreign firms. The third issue involves the effects, if any, of high-profile mass shootings and other 
violent crimes, on the firearms market. 
Given the characterization of certain firearms submarkets as being strong duopolies or oligopolies 
(Section 2 and (Brauer, 2013b)) and observing considerable variation in HHI for the U.S. firearms market 
as a whole as well as its submarkets (see Figure 4), we chose to investigate whether such industry supply 
concentrations are significant enough to influence production quantities. Since we have HHI information 
only for a subset of our study years (1986-2017), including the variable in the original SEM above would 
have reduced our number of observations from 71 to 31 (a drop of 56%). Accordingly, we re-ran controlled 
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and uncontrolled SEMs both with and without the inclusion of Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (HHIs), 
restricting the observations utilized in both cases to those in which HHIs exist, for both the overall market 
as well as for the pistol and rifle submarkets. 
 
Figure 4. HHIs for the overall U.S. firearms market and submarkets, 1986-2017. Source: the authors. 
The technology gap that existed between U.S. and foreign manufacturers in the 1980s and 1990s is 
commonly cited as a major factor in driving the steep rise in imported firearms to the U.S. over that period 
(Brauer (2013b); see Figure 3). We hypothesize, therefore, that the larger this gap, the fewer U.S.-made 
firearms would be sold. Since we have price indices for both domestically-produced and imported 
handguns sold in the U.S. for the period 1986-2017 and assuming that price is reflective of quality and 
technological sophistication in a given year, we are able to construct a proxy for the technology gap proxy 
as: 
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑡 = (𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑑,𝑡)/𝑃𝑑,𝑡      (4) 
where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑃𝑑,𝑡 the price of imported and domestically-produced handguns in time 𝑡, respectively. We 
use the same paired-sample methodology described above in our SEM estimations. 
Just as with HHIs and the technology gap, we had limited data on violence and crime. Three indicators of 
interest to us were (1) mass shootings (from a dataset collected and maintained by Mother Jones, 1982-
2016 (Follman, Aronson, & Pan, 2016)), (2) violent crimes in general (Department of Justice, 1960-2012). 
We ran side-by-side IV SEMs for each of these variables under uncontrolled and controlled scenarios, 
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restricting uncontrolled model observations by the same criteria that would apply in the controlled 
scenario. 
Table 6. Coefficients for selected predictors (HHI, technology gap, crimes) in various SEM models estimating 
quantity of firearms. Derived from ¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia.-¡Error! No se encuentra el 
origen de la referencia. in Appendix A. 
    1 2 
Predictor Category Uncontrolled Controlled 
HHI All -0.00242 -0.000862 
  (0.00155) (0.000520) 
 Hand guns: Pistols 0.0370 0.00167*** 
  (0.0250) (0.000321) 
 Hand guns: Revolvers -0.00152 -0.000113 
  (0.00198) (0.000103) 
 Long guns: Rifles -1.66e-05 0.000320* 
  (8.85e-05) (0.000127) 
 Long guns: Shotguns 0.000181* 0.000324** 
    (7.54e-05) (0.000105) 
Technology gap All -1.171*** -0.620* 
  (0.224) (0.279) 
 Handguns -3.555 -0.997*** 
  (4.125) (0.266) 
 Long guns -0.214 -0.490*** 
  (0.266) (0.141) 
Crime Mass Shootings 0.00899** 0.00300*** 
  (0.00335) (0.000812) 
 Violent Crimes -0.171 -0.293 
  (3.061) (1.179) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
Table 6 lists the values of coefficients for HHIs (only available for U.S. producers), the technology gap, and 
log-counts of selected crimes associated with firearms, within SEMs modeling quantity of firearms. HHI 
enters the SEM in the supply-side due to its presumed effects on competition pricing, while the technology 
gap and crimes enter on the demand-side due to their presumed effects on consumer willingness-to-pay. 
Coefficient estimates are derived in various sub-market categories as shown. Results from the industry 
concentration analysis show no cartel behavior overall. Strangely, there is evidence that industry 
concentration increases supply in the pistols submarket and, to a lesser extent, in the rifle and shotgun 
submarkets. These results would indicate that larger corporations are reaping economies of scale in those 
submarkets – though conspicuously this is not the case for revolvers6. There is evidence that the 
technology gap, as proxied, drives quantity demanded in the overall market, as well as in the handgun 
and long gun submarkets. In other words, larger gaps are associated with lower prices. As for crime, our 
basic model already provided evidence that homicides were positively associated with demand. Here, too, 
 
6 It is worth noting that import shares of revolvers (31%) are much lower than those for pistols (41%). 
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we find that mass shootings do indeed predict greater sales of firearms, but the effect size is only about 
1/10 the size. In the case of violent crimes more generally, no effect is observed. 
6. Conclusions 
We have presented a national-level model of the U.S. firearms market, 1946-2017, using an instrumental 
variable simultaneous equation model approach. We believe that this study contributes to the 
understanding, and potentially more information pertinent to, regulation of a complex market. The basic 
contours of this market conform to microeconomic theory: the price elasticity of supply is positive, that 
of demand is negative. However, some interesting tidbits emerge from the initial model and subsequent 
analyses, as follows: 
Firearms stocks and crime. Levels of existing stocks are not found to be associated with demand. 
However, when we include both stocks and 5-year stock lags in the models presented in Appendix Table 
3, a clear pattern emerges: current stocks are associated with depressed realized demand, while lagged 
stocks are associated with boosts. This finding may accord with the hypothesis that misuse and abuse of 
firearms generally erodes property security (and perhaps feelings of personal safety as well), implying that 
firearms create their own demand. Indeed, we do find that violent crimes generally, and mass shootings 
specifically, drive demand for firearms up. Such a finding is in agreement with theoretical models of 
conflict in the absence of property security (Caruso, 2010), as well as empirical studies of the effects of 
collective insecurity on firearms demand (McDowall & Loftin, 1983). The finding specific to mass shootings 
also accords with recent work suggesting that these events drive up prices, and have traditionally driven 
down firearms manufacturers’ stock prices – until a post-2010 “new normal” emerged (Gopal & 
Greenwood, 2017; Jones & Stone, 2015). These findings may suggest an economic justification for legal 
restrictions on the sales of firearms paralleling those on sales of harmful and addictive drugs, and for 
firearms buyback programs and small arms destruction programs in situations of over-supply. Further 
research is justified in assessing the elasticity of substitution of illegally-acquired weapons for legally-
acquired ones. 
Legislation. The (log) “burden” of firearms laws is not correlated to firearms sales. If firearms legislation 
does have a demand-dampening effect, it may also make legal purchase and ownership clearer and easier, 
or simply not do much besides stoke fears of impending firearms shortages. The major exception to this 
rule is the U.S. Federal Assault Weapons Ban (FAWB), signed into law in 1994 by then-President Clinton 
and allowed to expire 10 years later by then-President Bush, which we credit econometrically with a 0.25% 
drop in domestic firearms production for U.S. markets. These empirical findings may corroborate both 
seemingly-antithetical claims that firearms legislation largely has no significant effect on firearms sales 
(Polsby, 1994) and observations that the FAWB did in fact reduce the total availability of weapons on the 
market (Chicoine, 2011; Dube et al., 2013; Koper & Roth, 2002). This result may imply that firearms 
legislation only curbs volumes on the market when it involves an outright ban on some category of 
weapon. 
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War. We find that U.S. military campaigns abroad have a positive effect on quantity supplied both on the 
domestic and export markets, suggesting possible evidence of a military-industrial complex effect and 
economies of scale. 
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Appendix: Regression Tables 
 
Appendix Table 1. Relevance test of prospective disaster-related IVs predicting firearms price.  


























































Log Death Due to Disasters 0.0155 -0.0114*       
 (0.0134) (0.00605)       
Log People Rendered Homeless by Disasters   0.0137*** 0.000156     
   (0.00158) (0.00158)     
Log Total Affected by Disasters     0.0105*** -0.00114   
     (0.000984) (0.00179)   
Log Total Damages Due to Disasters (US$1,000)       0.0103*** -0.00035 
       (0.00312) (0.00130) 
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 70 68 70 68 70 68 70 68 
R-squared 0.016 0.872 0.507 0.865 0.508 0.866 0.259 0.865 





Appendix Table 2. Relevance test of prospective disaster-related IVs predicting firearms price.  


























Log Death Due to Disasters 0.0899 0.0124       
 (0.0762) (0.0350)       
Log People Rendered Homeless by Disasters   0.0612*** 0.00953     
   (0.0116) (0.00786)     
Log Total Affected by Disasters     0.0614*** 0.00970   
     (0.00824) (0.00709)   
Log Total Damages Due to Disasters (US$1,000)       0.0588*** -0.00198 
       (0.0150) (0.00947) 
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 72 69 72 69 72 69 72 69 
R-squared 0.014 0.925 0.278 0.927 0.453 0.928 0.225 0.925 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix Table 3. Log-log SEM estimations of domestic production of firearms for the U.S. market on disaster-affected 
population under five control specifications (IV = log disaster deaths). 
  (1) No Controls (2) Sociodemographic (3) Economics (4) Politics (5) Legislation (6) All Controls (7) All Controls1 
VARIABLES Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand 
Log Inflation-adjusted BLS Firearms Price Index = L, 5.259  4.538***  6.911***  3.327**  7.471***  3.422***  3.598***  
 (4.054)  (0.716)  (0.725)  (1.389)  (0.879)  (0.670)  (0.696)  
Log Inflation-adjusted BLS Firearms Price Index  6.106  -2.544  -7.98***  7.041***  4.580  -3.288**  -1.625 
  (5.052)  (3.382)  (2.481)  (1.921)  (2.794)  (1.301)  (1.157) 
Log US population in ('000s)    2.909        -0.873  1.399 
    (1.897)        (1.954)  (1.703) 
Log Number of Military Veterans    -1.242***        -0.740**  0.771* 
    (0.480)        (0.376)  (0.462) 
Log Estimated Total Firearms Stocks    -0.286        -0.172  -2.124*** 
    (1.027)        (0.688)  (0.732) 
Estimated Total Firearms Stocks = L,              1.2e-08*** 
              (3.22e-09) 
Homicide rate per 100k = L,    0.0899***        0.0527**  0.121*** 
    (0.0264)        (0.0254)  (0.0302) 
Suicide rate per 100k = L,    0.136        0.102  0.175*** 
    (0.109)        (0.0635)  (0.0591) 
Unemployment Rate = L,     0.101***      0.135***  0.127***  
     (0.0311)      (0.0291)  (0.0300)  
Log p.c. Real Disposable Personal Income, US$2009      1.996***      1.770***  0.752 
      (0.394)      (0.585)  (0.540) 
Sum UCDP War Intensity = L,       -0.0400    0.161*  0.158*  
       (0.105)    (0.0907)  (0.0940)  
Sum UCDP Cumulative War Intensity = L,       0.0957    -0.183  -0.176  
       (0.199)    (0.159)  (0.165)  
Party of the President (Dem= 1 / Rep = 0)        -0.0338    0.101**  0.123*** 
        (0.0688)    (0.0421)  (0.0394) 
Republican Share of House of Rep's        0.721    1.037*  0.751 
        (0.727)    (0.549)  (0.527) 
Republican Share of Senate        -1.282    -0.684  -0.134 
        (1.248)    (0.658)  (0.615) 
Anticipated Firearms Legislation Passage          0.0323  0.0589  0.00890 
          (0.0965)  (0.0487)  (0.0438) 
Log Firearms Laws = L,          0.340  0.162  0.113 
          (0.225)  (0.104)  (0.100) 
Federal Assault Weapons Ban in Effect = L,          -0.43***  -0.25***  -0.104 
          (0.137)  (0.0788)  (0.0864) 
Constant -8.831 -12.70 -5.553* 15.01 -16.9*** 45.33*** -0.0845 -16.67** -18.8*** -6.008 -1.408 49.39*** -2.165 24.51 
 (18.42) (22.97) (3.256) (24.43) (3.266) (10.11) (6.295) (8.249) (3.993) (12.48) (3.042) (18.13) (3.166) (15.03) 
Observations 69 69 69 69 68 68 69 69 69 69 68 68 66 66 
R-squared - - 0.041 0.861 - 0.644 0.175 - - 0.265 0.386 0.914 0.362 0.927 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 1 Includes a 5-year lag for log estimated civilian firearms stocks. 
 
Appendix Table 4. Log-log SEM estimations of U.S. exports on disaster-affected population under five control specifications: (1) no controls, (2) demographic controls, 
(3) economic controls, (4) political controls, (5) all previous controls. (IV = log disaster deaths) 
  (1) No Controls (2) Sociodemographic (3) Economics (4) Politics (5) Legislation (6) All Controls 
VARIABLES Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand 
Log Inflation-adjusted BLS Firearms Price Index = L, 5.492  1.294*  3.414***  0.120  5.331***  1.502**  
 (4.987)  (0.729)  (0.746)  (1.435)  (0.891)  (0.738)  
Log Inflation-adjusted BLS Firearms Price Index  6.376  -9.883*  -13.12***  1.055  -3.912  -1.088 
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  (6.224)  (5.793)  (4.107)  (1.702)  (3.269)  (1.534) 
Log US population in ('000s)    -0.674        0.436 
    (3.213)        (2.277) 
Log Number of Military Veterans    -1.483*        0.0628 
    (0.801)        (0.439) 
Log Estimated Total Firearms Stocks    1.399        -0.0526 
    (1.754)        (0.806) 
Homicide rate per 100k = L,    0.173***        0.107*** 
    (0.0436)        (0.0294) 
Suicide rate per 100k = L,    -0.0757        0.0997 
    (0.187)        (0.0740) 
Unemployment Rate = L,     0.103***      0.141***  
     (0.0318)      (0.0314)  
Log p. c. Real Disposable Personal Income, US$2009      2.175***      0.00145 
      (0.654)      (0.685) 
Sum UCDP War Intensity = L,       0.0295    0.249***  
       (0.103)    (0.0963)  
Sum UCDP Cumulative War Intensity = L,       -0.0612    -0.435**  
       (0.195)    (0.170)  
Party of the President (Dem= 1 / Rep = 0)        0.0302    0.150*** 
        (0.0512)    (0.0488) 
Republican Share of House of Rep's        -0.390    0.840 
        (0.528)    (0.639) 
Republican Share of Senate        0.531    -0.376 
        (1.055)    (0.766) 
Anticipated Firearms Legislation Passage          0.276**  0.0671 
          (0.111)  (0.0565) 
Log Firearms Laws = L,          0.774***  0.183 
          (0.264)  (0.121) 
Federal Assault Weapons Ban in Effect = L,          -0.415***  -0.306*** 
          (0.159)  (0.0914) 
Constant -12.56 -16.59 6.519** 64.42 -3.721 65.47*** 11.87* 7.519 -11.82*** 29.52** 4.741 9.581 
 (22.66) (28.30) (3.315) (41.70) (3.362) (16.74) (6.506) (7.346) (4.051) (14.60) (3.349) (21.17) 
Observations 69 69 69 69 68 68 69 69 69 69 68 68 
R-squared - - - - - - 0.001 0.009 - 0.649 0.183 0.842 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Appendix Table 5. Log-log SEM estimations of foreign imports on disaster-affected population under five control specifications (IV = log disaster deaths) 
  (1) No Controls (2) Sociodemographic (3) Economics (4) Politics (5) Legislation (6) All Controls 
VARIABLES Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand 
Log Inflation-adjusted BLS Firearms Price Index = L, 98.32**  88.94***  91.23***  99.38***  108.5***  90.02***  
 (39.64)  (6.900)  (6.538)  (14.25)  (8.555)  (6.362)  
Log Inflation-adjusted BLS Firearms Price Index  114.2**  51.27  -109.7**  124.0***  50.72*  27.38* 
  (49.68)  (34.38)  (43.77)  (16.81)  (28.76)  (14.43) 
Log US population in ('000s)    -35.33*        -35.62* 
    (19.25)        (21.32) 
Log Number of Military Veterans    0.681        -0.470 
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    (4.876)        (4.119) 
Log Estimated Total Firearms Stocks    15.87        30.79*** 
    (10.44)        (7.562) 
Homicide rate per 100k = L,    0.300        0.589** 
    (0.268)        (0.275) 
Suicide rate per 100k = L,    0.191        -0.639 
    (1.110)        (0.694) 
Unemployment Rate = L,     1.345***      1.189***  
     (0.282)      (0.268)  
Log p. c. Real Disposable Personal Income, US$2009      27.17***      -15.65** 
      (6.971)      (6.422) 
Sum UCDP War Intensity = L,       -0.147    1.035  
       (1.118)    (0.817)  
Sum UCDP Cumulative War Intensity = L,       -0.380    -2.543*  
       (2.087)    (1.443)  
Party of the President (Dem= 1 / Rep = 0)        0.0253    0.211 
        (0.709)    (0.456) 
Republican Share of House of Rep's        -7.747    -13.68** 
        (7.573)    (5.986) 
Republican Share of Senate        5.812    5.212 
        (11.27)    (7.173) 
Anticipated Firearms Legislation Passage          0.673  -0.266 
          (0.977)  (0.528) 
Log Firearms Laws = L,          4.489*  -1.797 
          (2.307)  (1.134) 
Federal Assault Weapons Ban in Effect = L,          -0.844  0.795 
          (1.394)  (0.854) 
Constant -438.5** -510.7** -395.8*** -101.0 -414.1*** 425.0** -442.5*** -554.7*** -484.6*** -226.3* -406.8*** -188.0 
 (180.2) (225.9) (31.36) (248.2) (29.45) (178.4) (64.57) (72.02) (38.88) (128.5) (28.85) (198.4) 
Observations 69 69 69 69 68 68 69 69 69 69 68 68 
R-squared 0.504 0.422 0.571 0.869 0.629 0.028 0.534 0.325 0.404 0.796 0.685 0.933 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix Table 6. Comparisons of IV SEMs for the total U.S. firearms market with and without the introduction 
of an overall HHI, 1986-2017. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 No HHI HHI No HHI HHI 
VARIABLES Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand 
Log Inflation-adjusted BLS Firearms Price Index = L, -11.39  -18.99  -3.855  -12.18***  
 (12.05)  (12.70)  (2.047)  (2.802)  
Log Inflation-adjusted BLS Firearms Price Index  -21.26  0.221  -10.10*  -9.814 
  (22.54)  (8.604)  (4.814)  (7.304) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index = L,   -0.00242    -0.000862  
   (0.00155)    (0.000520)  
Log US population in ('000s)      -14.59**  -16.92* 
      (4.487)  (7.271) 
Log Number of Military Veterans      -0.123  0.00455 
      (0.639)  (0.920) 
Log Estimated Total Firearms Stocks      5.046**  5.835* 
      (1.717)  (2.623) 
Homicide rate per 100k      0.0934  0.0924 
      (0.0696)  (0.0996) 
Suicide rate per 100k      -0.133  -0.150 
      (0.150)  (0.215) 
Log p. c. Real Disposable Personal Income, US$2009      3.201  3.424 
      (1.670)  (2.458) 
Party of the President (Dem= 1 / Rep = 0)      0.254***  0.267* 
      (0.0763)  (0.112) 
Republican Share of House of Rep's      0.146  0.272 
      (0.930)  (1.640) 
Republican Share of Senate      -3.839**  -4.224* 
      (1.190)  (1.862) 
Anticipated Firearms Legislation Passage      0.0197  0.0227 
      (0.0531)  (0.0818) 
Log Firearms Laws      -0.148  -0.122 
      (0.276)  (0.395) 
Federal Assault Weapons Ban in Effect      -0.0136  -0.0257 
      (0.130)  (0.188) 
Unemployment Rate = L,     0.0889**  0.0851**  
     (0.0316)  (0.0284)  
Sum UCDP War Intensity = L,     0.123  0.0871  
     (0.0732)  (0.0672)  
Sum UCDP Cumulative War Intensity = L,     -0.0778  -0.0366  
     (0.123)  (0.111)  
Constant 68.08 113.8 105.4 14.32 32.43*** 141.7** 71.78*** 151.7* 
 (55.81) (104.4) (60.04) (39.86) (9.536) (43.79) (13.34) (63.44) 
Observations 31 31 30 30 31 31 30 30 
R-squared - - 0.377 -0.013 0.659 0.945 0.802 0.946 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Appendix Table 7. Comparisons of IV SEMs for the U.S. handguns submarket with and without the introduction of 
pistol and revolver HHIs, 1986-2017. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 No HHI HHI No HHI HHI 
VARIABLES Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand 
Log Handgun Price Index (2012 = 0, Brauer) = L, -327.0  -174.0  -1.405  -1.641*  
 (14,720)  (123.2)  (1.192)  (0.774)  
Log Handgun Price Index (2012 = 0, Brauer)  -11.52  18.55***  0.0193  0.254 
  (18.93)  (3.080)  (0.476)  (0.415) 
HHI: Domestic Pistols = L,   0.0370    0.00167***  
   (0.0250)    (0.000321)  
HHI: Domestic Revolvers = L,   -0.00152    -0.000113  
   (0.00198)    (0.000103)  
Log US population in ('000s)      -7.879  -10.41* 
      (4.223)  (4.179) 
Log Number of Military Veterans      -0.0424  -0.101 
      (0.591)  (0.554) 
Log Estimated Total Firearms Stocks      2.083  3.069* 
      (1.432)  (1.409) 
Homicide rate per 100k = L,      0.0108  0.0858 
      (0.0346)  (0.0488) 
Suicide rate per 100k = L,      0.298***  0.225** 
      (0.0812)  (0.0810) 
Log p.c. Real Disposable Personal Income, US$2009      2.441  3.166 
      (2.003)  (1.932) 
Party of the President (Dem= 1 / Rep = 0)      0.256***  0.294*** 
      (0.0611)  (0.0620) 
Republican Share of House of Rep's      0.489  1.117 
      (0.716)  (0.733) 
Republican Share of Senate      -2.466**  -3.45*** 
      (0.761)  (0.873) 
Anticipated Firearms Legislation Passage      0.103*  0.125* 
      (0.0516)  (0.0489) 
Log Firearms Laws = L,      0.221  -0.0140 
      (0.198)  (0.207) 
Federal Assault Weapons Ban in Effect = L,      -0.26***  -0.155 
      (0.0768)  (0.0859) 
Unemployment Rate = L,     0.157*  0.140***  
     (0.0635)  (0.0412)  
Sum UCDP War Intensity = L,     0.273**  0.0949  
     (0.104)  (0.0723)  
Sum UCDP Cumulative War Intensity = L,     -0.259  -0.0731  
     (0.202)  (0.133)  
Constant 1,495 66.74 770.4 -69.6*** 19.58*** 62.37 19.62*** 73.37* 
 (66,673) (85.85) (538.8) (13.98) (5.595) (35.44) (3.767) (33.63) 
Observations 32 32 31 31 31 31 30 30 
R-squared - - - - 0.655 0.973 0.848 0.976 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Appendix Table 8. Comparisons of IV SEMs for the U.S. long gun submarket with and without the introduction of 
an overall HHI, 1986-2017. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 No HHI HHI No HHI HHI 
VARIABLES Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand 
Log Longgun Price Index (2012 = 0, Brauer) = L, 0.758  0.744  -0.0567  -0.724  
 (1.472)  (0.875)  (0.601)  (0.522)  
Log Longgun Price Index (2012 = 0, Brauer)  1.571  3.081***  0.966*  0.491 
  (2.861)  (0.492)  (0.427)  (0.328) 
HHI: Domestic Rifles = L,   -1.66e-05    0.000320*  
   (8.85e-05)    (0.000127)  
HHI: Domestic Shotguns = L,   0.000181*    0.000324**  
   (7.54e-05)    (0.000105)  
Log US population in ('000s)      -13.2***  -12.1*** 
      (3.496)  (3.638) 
Log Number of Military Veterans      0.421  0.696 
      (0.592)  (0.512) 
Log Estimated Total Firearms Stocks      2.844*  2.284 
      (1.295)  (1.263) 
Homicide rate per 100k = L,      0.0227  0.0105 
      (0.0427)  (0.0522) 
Suicide rate per 100k = L,      0.0793  0.127 
      (0.0837)  (0.0815) 
Log p. c. Real Disposable Personal Income, US$2009      4.141*  4.497** 
      (1.609)  (1.607) 
Party of the President (Dem= 1 / Rep = 0)      0.258***  0.244*** 
      (0.0571)  (0.0575) 
Republican Share of House of Rep's      1.584**  1.690** 
      (0.588)  (0.617) 
Republican Share of Senate      -2.21***  -2.310** 
      (0.640)  (0.771) 
Anticipated Firearms Legislation Passage      0.0785  0.0797* 
      (0.0405)  (0.0370) 
Log Firearms Laws = L,      0.213  0.229 
      (0.181)  (0.189) 
Federal Assault Weapons Ban in Effect = L,      -0.0708  -0.0519 
      (0.0688)  (0.0781) 
Unemployment Rate = L,     0.0422  -0.0419  
     (0.0298)  (0.0371)  
Sum UCDP War Intensity = L,     0.0805  -0.0388  
     (0.0680)  (0.0634)  
Sum UCDP Cumulative War Intensity = L,     -0.0321  0.186  
     (0.118)  (0.115)  
Constant 11.37 7.719 10.92** 0.973 14.58*** 98.97*** 16.57*** 91.52** 
 (6.568) (12.81) (3.839) (2.204) (2.688) (29.07) (2.258) (28.59) 
Observations 32 32 31 31 31 31 30 30 
R-squared 0.188 0.286 0.451 -0.191 0.515 0.934 0.640 0.938 




Appendix Table 9. Comparisons of IV SEMs for the U.S. firearms market with and without the introduction of a 
technology gap proxy, 1989-2017 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 No HHI HHI No HHI HHI 
VARIABLES Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand 
Log Inflation-adjusted BLS Firearms Price Index = L, -45.30  -34.22  -15.5***  -15.3***  
 (46.15)  (33.85)  (1.399)  (1.383)  
Log Inflation-adjusted BLS Firearms Price Index  3.313***  3.351***  -8.451  -9.220 
  (0.0995)  (0.105)  (7.082)  (6.676) 
U.S.-Foreign Technology Gap Proxy    -1.17***    -0.620* 
    (0.224)    (0.279) 
Log US population in ('000s)      -8.146  -4.665 
      (4.674)  (4.673) 
Log Number of Military Veterans      0.529  0.872 
      (0.635)  (0.612) 
Log Estimated Total Firearms Stocks      1.393  1.536 
      (1.735)  (1.632) 
Homicide rate per 100k = L,      0.00604  0.0910 
      (0.0386)  (0.0527) 
Suicide rate per 100k = L,      0.168  0.104 
      (0.172)  (0.166) 
Log p. c. Real Disposable Personal Income, US$2009      3.939  2.040 
      (2.172)  (2.237) 
Party of the President (Dem= 1 / Rep = 0)      0.210**  0.286*** 
      (0.0672)  (0.0711) 
Republican Share of House of Rep's      0.0672  -0.0218 
      (1.680)  (1.580) 
Republican Share of Senate      -2.60**  -2.387** 
      (0.875)  (0.829) 
Anticipated Firearms Legislation Passage      0.0530  -0.00284 
      (0.0882)  (0.0878) 
Log Firearms Laws      0.166  -0.490 
      (0.338)  (0.442) 
Federal Assault Weapons Ban in Effect      0.00722  0.189 
      (0.104)  (0.130) 
Unemployment Rate = L,     0.115***  0.115***  
     (0.0153)  (0.0153)  
Sum UCDP War Intensity = L,     0.0793*  0.0786*  
     (0.0360)  (0.0359)  
Sum UCDP Cumulative War Intensity = L,     -0.0415  -0.0407  
     (0.0596)  (0.0595)  
Constant 225.3  174.0  86.46*** 106.2* 85.67*** 65.04 
 (213.9)  (156.9)  (6.500) (41.92) (6.423) (42.77) 
Observations 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
R-squared - - - - 0.919 0.955 0.920 0.959 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Appendix Table 10. Comparisons of IV SEMs for the U.S. handguns market with and without the introduction of a 
technology gap proxy, 1989-2017 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 No HHI HHI No HHI HHI 
VARIABLES Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand 
Log Handgun Price Index (2012 = 0, Brauer) = L, 9.286  3.330*  -2.002  -1.949  
 (9.405)  (1.483)  (1.214)  (1.213)  
Log Handgun Price Index (2012 = 0, Brauer)  -24.51  -10.49  0.231  -1.388* 
  (59.48)  (9.687)  (0.468)  (0.626) 
U.S.-Foreign Technology Gap Proxy    -3.555    -0.997*** 
    (4.125)    (0.266) 
Log US population in ('000s)      -7.480  0.0391 
      (4.334)  (4.075) 
Log Number of Military Veterans      -0.129  1.030 
      (0.541)  (0.575) 
Log Estimated Total Firearms Stocks      2.548  0.0464 
      (1.387)  (1.337) 
Homicide rate per 100k = L,      0.0641  0.0133 
      (0.0498)  (0.0456) 
Suicide rate per 100k = L,      0.237**  0.369*** 
      (0.0809)  (0.0781) 
Log p. c. Real Disposable Personal Income, US$2009      1.978  0.564 
      (2.029)  (1.738) 
Party of the President (Dem= 1 / Rep = 0)      0.269***  0.265*** 
      (0.0634)  (0.0536) 
Republican Share of House of Rep's      1.031  1.566* 
      (0.718)  (0.632) 
Republican Share of Senate      -3.00***  -1.838* 
      (0.879)  (0.803) 
Anticipated Firearms Legislation Passage      0.129*  -0.00158 
      (0.0562)  (0.0617) 
Log Firearms Laws = L,      -0.136  -0.100 
      (0.259)  (0.220) 
Federal Assault Weapons Ban in Effect = L,      -0.142  -0.226** 
      (0.0882)  (0.0783) 
Unemployment Rate = L,     0.154*  0.157*  
     (0.0626)  (0.0625)  
Sum UCDP War Intensity = L,     0.267*  0.270**  
     (0.104)  (0.104)  
Sum UCDP Cumulative War Intensity = L,     -0.235  -0.243  
     (0.200)  (0.200)  
Constant -27.68 125.9 -0.611 62.71 22.30*** 51.29 22.05*** -4.144 
 (42.75) (270.3) (6.741) (44.63) (5.685) (34.85) (5.679) (32.18) 
Observations 29 29 29 29 28 28 28 28 
R-squared - - - - 0.682 0.980 0.683 0.984 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Appendix Table 11. Comparisons of IV SEMs for the U.S. long guns market with and without the introduction of a 
technology gap proxy, 1989-2017 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 No HHI HHI No HHI HHI 
VARIABLES Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand 
Log Longgun Price Index (2012 = 0, Brauer) = L, 1.583  1.305  -0.0205  -0.0767  
 (1.148)  (0.703)  (0.547)  (0.585)  
Log Longgun Price Index (2012 = 0, Brauer)  2.629  2.249***  1.287*  0.583** 
  (2.093)  (0.570)  (0.525)  (0.220) 
U.S.-Foreign Technology Gap Proxy   -0.214     -0.490*** 
   (0.266)     (0.141) 
Log US population in ('000s)      -13.97**  -9.749** 
      (4.593)  (3.560) 
Log Number of Military Veterans      0.215  1.106* 
      (0.656)  (0.451) 
Log Estimated Total Firearms Stocks      3.139*  1.873 
      (1.518)  (1.130) 
Homicide rate per 100k = L,      0.0757  0.0247 
      (0.0717)  (0.0422) 
Suicide rate per 100k = L,      0.0334  0.150* 
      (0.106)  (0.0687) 
Log p. c. Real Disposable Personal Income, US$2009      4.478*  3.412* 
      (2.082)  (1.593) 
Party of the President (Dem= 1 / Rep = 0)      0.276***  0.263*** 
      (0.0724)  (0.0509) 
Republican Share of House of Rep's      1.948**  1.974*** 
      (0.734)  (0.548) 
Republican Share of Senate      -2.807**  -2.148** 
      (0.952)  (0.704) 
Anticipated Firearms Legislation Passage      0.123*  0.0884* 
      (0.0530)  (0.0385) 
Log Firearms Laws = L,      0.137  0.313 
      (0.291)  (0.206) 
Federal Assault Weapons Ban in Effect = L,      -0.00835  -0.106 
      (0.103)  (0.0718) 
Unemployment Rate = L,     0.0683*  0.0732*  
     (0.0303)  (0.0309)  
Sum UCDP War Intensity = L,     0.104  0.118  
     (0.0657)  (0.0668)  
Sum UCDP Cumulative War Intensity = L,     -0.0986  -0.113  
     (0.116)  (0.118)  
Constant 7.715 3.011 8.990** 4.717 14.33*** 103.7** 14.54*** 65.44* 
 (5.129) (9.373) (3.159) (2.553) (2.447) (36.48) (2.618) (28.61) 
Observations 29 29 29 29 28 28 28 28 
R-squared 0.199 0.035 0.243 0.182 0.499 0.922 0.504 0.960 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Appendix Table 12. Comparisons of IV SEMs for the U.S.firearms with and without the introduction of Mother 
Jones mass shootings, 1986-2017 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 No HHI HHI No HHI HHI 
VARIABLES Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand 
Log Inflation-adjusted BLS Firearms Price Index = L, -37.96  41.14***  2.257  2.503  
 (60.63)  (10.11)  (1.442)  (1.519)  
Log Inflation-adjusted BLS Firearms Price Index  3.314***  13.17  -3.710  -3.776* 
  (0.141)  (12.25)  (2.752)  (1.663) 
Mother Jones Mass Shootings: Fatalities = L,    0.00899**    0.00300*** 
    (0.00335)    (0.000812) 
Log US population in ('000s)      -2.368  -5.723 
      (7.377)  (4.555) 
Log Number of Military Veterans      -0.199  -0.104 
      (0.659)  (0.440) 
Log Estimated Total Firearms Stocks      1.105  0.947 
      (1.937)  (1.322) 
Homicide rate per 100k = L,      0.0147  0.00419 
      (0.0576)  (0.0378) 
Suicide rate per 100k = L,      0.124  0.182* 
      (0.109)  (0.0776) 
Log p. c. Real Disposable Personal Income, US$2009      0.751  2.719 
      (3.119)  (1.828) 
Party of the President (Dem= 1 / Rep = 0)      0.128  0.174** 
      (0.0964)  (0.0598) 
Republican Share of House of Rep's      0.729  0.543 
      (0.648)  (0.500) 
Republican Share of Senate      -2.008  -1.899* 
      (1.384)  (0.891) 
Anticipated Firearms Legislation Passage      0.0400  0.0537 
      (0.0505)  (0.0348) 
Log Firearms Laws      0.201  0.315* 
      (0.200)  (0.141) 
Federal Assault Weapons Ban in Effect      -0.134  -0.0910 
      (0.108)  (0.0697) 
Unemployment Rate = L,     0.0942*  0.0899*  
     (0.0367)  (0.0374)  
Sum UCDP War Intensity = L,     0.112  0.156  
     (0.0825)  (0.0856)  
Sum UCDP Cumulative War Intensity = L,     -0.0734  -0.138  
     (0.139)  (0.144)  
Constant 190.6  -174.8*** -45.73 4.119 40.43 2.984 76.67 
 (280.0)  (46.70) (56.58) (6.804) (65.71) (7.166) (40.28) 
Observations 35 35 34 34 35 35 34 34 
R-squared - - - - 0.472 0.929 0.507 0.970 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
30
Appendix Table 13. Comparisons of IV SEMs for the U.S.firearms market with and without the introduction of log 
violent crimes, 1960-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 No HHI HHI No HHI HHI 
VARIABLES Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand 
Log Inflation-adjusted BLS Firearms Price Index = L, 5.986  4.349***  1.694*  1.361  
 (7.175)  (1.285)  (0.738)  (0.715)  
Log Inflation-adjusted BLS Firearms Price Index  7.202  6.057  -1.761  -1.362 
  (9.911)  (33.07)  (1.647)  (2.419) 
Log (sum) violent_crimes = L,    -0.171    -0.293 
    (3.061)    (1.179) 
Log US population in ('000s)      8.145  10.49* 
      (5.065)  (4.681) 
Log Number of Military Veterans      0.272  0.848 
      (0.605)  (0.983) 
Log Estimated Total Firearms Stocks      -2.032  -2.233 
      (1.465)  (1.385) 
Homicide rate per 100k = L,      0.0778*  0.0983 
      (0.0329)  (0.149) 
Suicide rate per 100k = L,      0.185  0.267 
      (0.114)  (0.155) 
Log p. c. Real Disposable Personal Income, US$2009      -0.227  -0.768 
      (1.113)  (1.692) 
Party of the President (Dem= 1 / Rep = 0)      0.0721  0.0645 
      (0.0579)  (0.0783) 
Republican Share of House of Rep's      0.406  0.597 
      (0.836)  (1.357) 
Republican Share of Senate      -0.215  -0.178 
      (1.100)  (1.890) 
Anticipated Firearms Legislation Passage      0.0479  0.0596 
      (0.0585)  (0.0744) 
Log Firearms Laws      0.267*  0.303 
      (0.127)  (0.202) 
Federal Assault Weapons Ban in Effect      -0.154  -0.109 
      (0.0990)  (0.181) 
Unemployment Rate = L,     0.111**  0.114**  
     (0.0349)  (0.0340)  
Sum UCDP War Intensity = L,     0.219  0.183  
     (0.128)  (0.127)  
Sum UCDP Cumulative War Intensity = L,     -0.333  -0.268  
     (0.220)  (0.217)  
Constant -12.14 -17.70 -4.656 -10.09 6.680 -46.60 8.202* -79.12 
 (32.70) (45.19) (5.858) (108.5) (3.429) (48.15) (3.325) (47.49) 
Observations 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
R-squared - - - - 0.171 0.902 0.204 0.881 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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